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Introduction:TheKumazawaCase
A very curious letter came across Douglas MacArthurʼs 
desk on August 11, 1947. It was hardly the only letter to arrive 
that day, to be sure. MacArthur was the Supreme Commander 
for the Allied Powers—SCAP—and essentially the de facto 
shogun of Japan. Since Japanʼs defeat in the Greater East Asia 
War, MacArthur had reigned as head of General Headquarters, 
GHQ, and, in eﬀect, as the benevolent dictator of the entire 
archipelago. 
The SCAP archives, housed in the National Diet Library 
in Nagatachō, contain boxes and boxes of microﬁched letters 
to the power behind the Chrysanthemum Throne. Summarized 
and also mimeographed from the originals, the letters touch 
on every conceivable subject, from complaints about the black 
market and concerns about building practices to denunciations 
of individuals and organizations for reasons both public-
minded and personal, profound and petty.
But one letter stands out. Here is how the English 
summary of an August, 1947 missive reads:
Doc No 33528　　　JRB/GI/SN
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED 
POWERS
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL 
STAFF
ALLIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER 
SECTION
NOTE: Translation directed by Commander-in-Chief
Received ATIS: 11 Aug 47.
DIGEST OF LETTER
TO: General MacARTHUR.
FROM: KUMAZAWA, Hiromichi (熊沢寛道)
KYOTO To, SAKYO ku, TANAKA KITAHARUNA – 1.
DATE: (No date.)
The writer states that during the period when the Imperial 
throne was divided between the Northern and Southern 
Dynasties, Emperor GOKOMATSU (後小松) of the 
Northern Dynasty killed Prince JITSUHITO (実仁), son 
and heir of Emperor GOKAMEYAMA (後亀山) of the 
Southern Dynasty, thus putting an end to the Southern 
Dynasty. The Northern Dynasty then became sole 
claimant to the Imperial throne.
The writer has conducted extensive research throughout 
NARA, MIE, FUKUSHIMA, and AICHI prefectures 
and has discovered the continuance of the lineage of 
the Southern Dynasty. He submits 25 photographs of 
old documents, tombstones, treasures of the Southern 
Dynasty, Imperial Seals, etc. This evidence allegedly 
supports the writerʼs claim to the Imperial Throne as the 
direct descendant of the Southern Dynasty.
The writer further states that the present emperor, who led 
JAPAN into war and disastrous defeat, is now touring the 
nation, expending huge sums of the tax payers [sic] and is 
unconcerned about his responsibility for the war.
There follow copies of the envelope, the original 
letter (running to eleven mimeographed pages), and the 
aforementioned twenty-ﬁve photographs, each duly annotated 
in the letterʼs text. Whoever Kumazawa was, this was not a 
letter done lightly. Even if the arguments of the letter were 
false—that is, if Kumazawa Hiromichi, a shopkeeper from 
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Nagoya, was not really the legitimate heir of the Southern 
Dynasty, or, even if he was, if the Southern Dynasty was 
not the legitimate claimant to the Chrysanthemum Throne—
Kumazawa seemed to be convinced of the legitimacy of his 
claim.1
Indeed, shortly after sending the letter to Gen. MacArthur, 
Kumazawa visited Niigata, where he repeated the gist of what 
he had conveyed to GHQ. This was part of a nationwide tour 
on which Kumazawa was embarked, timed to coincide with 
the tour of the Shōwa Emperor organized by the Occupation 
authorities to help buttress his popular standing and thereby 
cement MacArthurʼs dual decision to maintain the imperial 
system while also democratizing Japan. The Kumazawa 
shadow-tour was also part of Hiromichiʼs ongoing ﬁght 
to have his claims recognized and himself installed on the 
Chrysanthemum Throne, a ﬁght which would culminate in a 
lawsuit ﬁled in 1951 in Tokyo District Court seeking to have 
the Shōwa Emperor de-recognized as the legitimate sovereign 
of Japan.2
Kumazawa was not alone in his criticism of the Emperor. 
In a famous incident from May of 1946, a Communist named 
Matsushima Matsutarō (1915-2001) had appeared in a crowd 
in Tokyo with a sign on which were written, front and back, 
messages mocking the Emperor and criticizing him for eating 
well while regular people starved to death. Matsushima was 
brought up on charges of lèse-majesté, but SCAP oﬃcials 
forced the reformulation of the charge to defamation on the 
grounds that the Emperor should not receive special legal 
treatment.3 Nor was Kumazawa alone in claiming to be the 
legitimate emperor—as many as eighteen other men claimed 
during the early postwar years to be the real heir to the throne.4
What makes Kumazawaʼs case noteworthy, in part, is its 
prominence. He was by far the most famous, or infamous, 
person in living memory to attack the legitimacy of the 
reigning sovereign by claiming to be the real Emperor himself. 
But this prominence had an equally noteworthy reaction, 
for Kumazawa, although the object of curiosity among 
many people in Japan, was also subjected to intense scorn. 
Kumazawa was an amusing sideshow for some, but overall his 
appeal to the man and woman in the street fell disastrously ﬂat. 
In stark contrast to Kumazawa, the real Emperor was really 
and truly popular, a fact that played into MacArthurʼs plans to 
use him to build political stability in the country MacArthur 
was ruling. Kumazawa failed to enlist even a fraction of that 
kind of popular regard.
Many could not contain their contempt for Kumazawa 
and took to the papers to vent it. For example, SCAP archives 
contain an English translation of a letter sent by a certain 
Izumo Asahi5 to the Jiji Shimpo newspaper, apparently in early 
September of 1947 (right after Kumazawa sent his letter to 
GHQ), which began:
A person named Emperor KUMAZAWA came to Niigata 
City on the 22nd [of August, 1947?] and stated the so-
called ʻlegitimacy of the Southern Dynastyʼ. He said, ʻI 
have not renounced the throne but leave the judgement 
to the peopleʼs free will,ʼ or ʻI do not have any personal 
feelings toward Hirohito but I may allow him just to see 
me.ʼ How audacious he is!
“The people are laughing at you,” Mr. Izumo declared 
in his missive to the Jiji Shimpo. His opinion was widely 
1 The debate over the legitimacy of the current Northern Dynasty line has largely gone into abatement in recent decades, but it remains 
substantially unresolved. See, e.g., Shimura Kunihiro, ed., Tennō kōzoku rekishi densetsu daijiten (Tokyo: Bensei Shuppan, 2008), Nitta 
Ichirō, Taiheiki no jidai (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2001), Fujii Jōji and Yoshioka Masayuki, eds., Go-Daigo tennō jitsuroku, vols. 1 & 2 (Tokyo: 
Yumani Shobō, 2009), Fujimaki Kazuho, Wagahai wa tennō nari: Kumazawa tennō jiken (Tokyo: Gakushū Kenkyūsha, 2007), Yamaji 
Yūichirō, Gonanchō saihakkutsu (Tokyo: Soubunsha, 2003), Yamaji Yūichirō, Nanchō: saigo no shōgen (Tokyo: Choeisha, 2008), and 
Murata Masashi, Nanbokuchōron (Tokyo: Shibundō, 1959). Murata comes down hard on Yoshida Chōzō, Kumazawaʼs shadowy champion 
(and possible communist provocateur), agreeing with his mentor Watanabe Yosuke (1874-1957) that the Kumazawa genealogy Yoshida had 
produced was “utterly baseless, and predicated upon a mistaken reading” of other documents. (Murata, Nanbokuchōron, op. cit., 260-61, citing 
Watanabe Yosuke, “Keizu no gisaku ni tsuite: Kumazawa tennō, Sakamoto tennō ryō keifu no bakugeki,” Nihon Rekishi, no. 35 (April, 1951). 
Undaunted, Yoshida published the next year Kiku no kāten wo hiraku: Shin tennōron (Tokyo: Chiyoda Shoin, 1952), which contains two 
photographs: “Kumazawa tennō” and his family, as well as a photograph of the Imperial Family, to the leader of which Yoshida refers as the 
“Ashikaga tennō”. George Sansom writes, “Viewed in the light of subsequent events, the struggle between the two Courts [i.e., Northern and 
Southern] failed to decide the issue of legitimacy. It has never been settled.” A History of Japan, 1334-1615 (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1961), 118.
2 The lawsuit was dismissed, both on ﬁrst instance and on appeal, on the grounds that the constitution of Japan does not provide for conducting 
trials of the Emperor.
3 See Yokosaka Kenji, “Tennō to fukeizai,” in Kenpō hanrei hyakusen II, no. 5 (Yuhikaku, 2007).
4 See Hosaka Masayasu, Tennō ga jūkunin ita: samazama naru sengo (Kadokawa Bunko, 1995).
5 The handwriting of this name is not entirely clear in the original.
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6 Kumazawaʼs case was widely covered in the American press at the time, as well, although writers seem to have been conﬂicted on how to 
cover Kumazawa—was he comic fool, pathetically delusional, serious rival to Hirohito? See, e.g., Richard E. Lauterbach, “The True Emperor 
of Japan?” Life, vol. 20, no. 3 (Jan. 21, 1946).
7 On early Japanese kingship, see Kishi Toshio, ed., Ōken wo meguru tatakai (Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha, 1986).
8 See, e.g., Michitsuna no Haha, tr. Edward Seidensticker, The Gossamer Years (Kagerō nikki): A Diary by a Noblewoman of Heian Japan 
(Tokyo: C.E. Tuttle, 1973), Ivan Morris, The World of the Shining Prince: Court Life in Ancient Japan (New York: Kodansha International, 
1964), and Murasaki Shikibu, tr. Arthur Waley, The Tale of Genji (Tokyo: Tuttle, 2010).
shared. As the realities of postwar life, and the return to power 
geopolitics with the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, 
set in, Kumazawaʼs odd star faded rapidly from view. He is 
now almost completely forgotten, only rarely appearing in 
scholarly monographs as, at most, a footnote in a section on 
postwar Japanese legal history.6
TheRight of Conquest and thePre-Modern
JapanesePast
Setting aside the question of whether Kumazawa really 
was the legitimate heir to the Chrysanthemum Throne, 
however, as well as the historical importance (arguably very 
slight) of his public relations and legal campaigns during the 
immediate postwar, there is something abidingly unsettling 
about Kumazawa, both the legacy that he represents (or at 
least claims to have represented) and the questions that that 
legacy raises about legitimacy in general. Kumazawa, in 
his tragicomic way, interrogates the right to rule over given 
territories and populations and the uneasy relationship between 
the scepter and the sword, a relationship that has changed over 
time, in many ways, but in many ways also remains unaltered 
from time immemorial. Whether Kumazawa really was the 
emperor or not, his case unsettles many of our assumptions 
about current political rule. In short, Kumazawaʼs antics 
dredge up the often inconvenient facts of history. Chief among 
these is the right of conquest.
Many have argued that conquest is the most basic form of 
politics. The predecessors of the Japanese Imperial Line were 
no exception to this often-stated rule. The earliest Japanese 
rulers had been as the early kings of Europe: conquerors 
who led troops into battle but who administered territory 
loosely, lacking the apparatus of the modern state as well 
as the technology—such as writing and printing—to form 
a bureaucracy and impose systematic order on a realm. But 
there is an important diﬀerence, too. Japanese emperors, 
from the beginning, were unlike European kings in that the 
former were also high priests—more than that, descended 
from the gods, as was also said of Egyptian pharaohs and 
Greek heroes.7 As such, Japanese emperors held more than 
just terrorizing dominion over those under them. They had a 
charism of rule that went far beyond the subjugation of rivals 
at the point of a sword. This charism allowed the emperors to 
shift back and forth from active to passive rule, and it is one 
such shift in particular that forms the basis of Kumazawaʼs 
claims, and which puzzles us today as to the real nature of 
legitimate government.
But in order to get a proper understanding of Kumazawaʼs 
plaint, we must ﬁrst go back to a time before this shift 
occurred. During the Heian Period, the Japanese emperors, 
formerly compelled by an elaborate network of taboos to 
abandon capitals and establish new bases of government 
whenever a reigning emperor died, settled into a ﬁxed capital 
city, Heian-kyō (todayʼs Kyoto), where they oversaw a cultural 
ﬂourishing rarely equalled elsewhere. The key to this highly-
developed civilization was the political passivity of the 
Imperial Household, the emphasis on religious and cultural 
pursuits, and the near-total abandonment of the active mode 
of sovereignty.8 During this period of the ﬂowering of the arts 
and climaxing of the aesthetic sensibilities of the Imperial 
Household and associated nobles, security was farmed out 
to provincial police. When order broke down in Heian-kyō 
and these armed forces began to war with one another, a long 
season of civil war ensued and the old Heian halcyon days 
were lost. The emperors remained passive cultural ﬁgures, 
and retained their religious authority and courtly dignity, but 
they had become captives of the warlords. Real power lay 
with the Minamoto clan, warriors who had defeated their 
rival, the Taira, and instituted martial law in 1192 in a new 
political capital, Kamakura. By an odd right of half-conquest, 
military leaders had seized the realm but left the charism of 
religious and spiritual rule untouched. The emperors were 
kept in a gilded cage inside the palace grounds, and a multi-
generational standoﬀ ensued. No warrior dared to have himself 
crowned emperor in a reigning emperorʼs place, and emperor 
dared to try seizing power from the shogun who ruled Japan 
in his stead.
As is often the case with warlords, the Minamoto were 
unable to govern the realm they had wrested from the crown. 
Eventually, the Minamoto were themselves subjected to 
regency, in the same way that the powerful Fujiwara family 
had once controlled the Imperial Household from behind the 
scenes during the Heian by means of marriage politics and 
courtly intrigue. By a continuation of this same basic policy, the 
Hōjō clan, a branch of the Taira family (the Minamotosʼ mortal 
enemies), managed to install weak shoguns in Kamakura and 
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also to control the Imperial Household in Kyoto. During the 
period of Hōjō control, Japanese emperors were intentionally 
“retired” into cloistered desuetude at a very young age, before 
they posed any danger of insisting on ruling Japan in their 
own name. This fear of an emperor switching from passive 
to active mode was not an unfounded one. Emperor Go-Toba 
staged a revolt against Hōjō dominance in 1221, and there 
was no guarantee that another such manly emperor would not 
again attempt something similar.
The Hōjō managed to keep the chain of emperors weak for 
almost one hundred years after Go-Tobaʼs attempt to recover 
full rule in his own person. However, an interruption in the 
supply of infant heirs to the throne led to the installation of an 
adult, Go-Daigo, in 1318. Just as the Hōjō had always feared, 
a determined emperor became a kinetic force for imperial 
restoration and eventually led an assault on the entrenched 
Hōjō shadow-usurpers. In the course of the long civil war 
that followed Go-Daigoʼs restorationist drive, a rival to Hōjō 
power, Ashikaga Takauji—a turncoat who had originally been 
sent to help the Hōjō suppress Go-Daigoʼs rebellion—saw 
a chance to become the shogun in the wake of Go-Daigoʼs 
salient into Kamakura power.
When Go-Daigoʼs forces emerged victorious after Hōjō 
support collapsed, Ashikaga and the many other retainers 
who had rallied to the imperial cause expected boons for their 
loyalty, especially in the form of rich estates that the warrior 
clans had originally stolen from the Imperial Household at 
the end of the Kamakura. But when it became clear the Go-
Daigo had no intention of returning to the former program of 
submission to samurai control, Ashikaga defected once again, 
installing a new “emperor” on the throne as a way to reinstate 
the practice of manipulating pliant emperors into doing the 
will of the warlords.
Go-Daigo continued to reign in exile, ﬁrst from the remote 
Oki islands, and then from Yoshino, in Nara. This situation 
continued through several generations of emperor and counter-
emperor—the so-called Southern and Northern Courts—until 
Go-Daigoʼs great-grandson, Emperor Go-Kameyama, was 
tricked into a duumvirate by one of the Ashikaga puppet 
“emperors” and then betrayed once he had delivered into 
Ashikaga hands the three sacred treasures (later claimed to be 
counterfeits) of the imperial line. The Northern Court thus won 
the protracted civil war by sheer skullduggery. Although the 
impostor emperor was a member of the Imperial Household, 
he hailed from a lateral line. The true, patrilineal heirs were—
and are, it has often been asserted—the descendants of Go-
Daigo. If such a person could be found, then he would have 
a much stronger claim to the Chrysanthemum Throne than 
the “Ashikaga emperor,” as Kumazawa derisively called the 
Shōwa Emperor. Any direct male descendant of Go-Daigo 
would pose a serious threat to imperial legitimacy.
After the civil war, this issue went into almost complete 
abatement. For centuries after the Ashikaga betrayal (which 
ushered in the Muromachi period (1336-1573) of Ashikaga 
rule), the emperor was, again, under warrior control. The 
Tokugawa shoguns were no exception, and the Japanese 
emperorsʼ captive-exalted status continued until Mutsuhito—
Emperor Meiji—was installed on the throne by crusading 
reformers in 1868. But the ghost of Go-Daigo still haunted 
the Ashikaga line. The new Meiji Emperorʼs counsellors were 
fearful lest a rival claimant appear to relitigate the nearly-600-
year-old case. This is exactly what happened when Hiromichiʼs 
father, Hiroshika, appealed to the Meiji Emperor for redress of 
his grievances as the legitimate descendant of Go-Daigo. The 
Meiji Emperor, greatly troubled by these claims, instructed 
his ministers to deal sincerely with Hiroshika, even ordering 
that he and his kin be made part of the Imperial Family.9 
But Hiroshika, believing himself to be the real Emperor, 
and not just a member of the peerage, refused. The Japanese 
government intervened with a special pronouncement in 1911, 
but the debate that had been raging prior to that year over 
the legitimacy of the Ashikaga line continued to simmer.10 
When Hiroshikaʼs son, Kumazawa Hiromichi, made a play for 
imperial succession after the end of the Greater East Asia War, 
the old wounds of the Southern and Northern courts opened 
again and the question of the legitimacy of the Northern line—
the line that sits on the Chrysanthemum Throne to this day—
threatened once more to throw Japan into turmoil.
TheRightofConquestinModernJapaneseand
World-HistoricalContext
The second half of 1947, when Kumazawa Hiromichi 
began his nationwide campaign to reclaim the imperial title, 
was especially perilous, because during that year the fate 
of the Shōwa Emperor hung in the balance. Gen. Douglas 
MacArthur, who was contemplating a Republican bid for 
the presidency, was under considerable political pressure in 
the United States to put the emperor on trial, even to execute 
him.11 The new kingmaker of Japan wore pressed khakis 
9 Kumazawa Hiromichi, “Mihappyō: ʻKumazawa tennōʼ kaikoroku,” Jinbutsu Ōrai: Tokushū: Ranse bushō hiroku (Nov., 1958), 134-35.
10 See Endō Akiko, “Nanbokuchō no nairan ga kindai ni nokoshita fu no isan: Nanbokuchō seijun ronsō towa nan datta noka,” in Rekishi Real 
Nanbokuchō: Futatsu no chōtei ga heiritsu shita ijō jitai wa naze okita no ka (Tokyo: Yosensha, 2017), 100-103.
11 See Nanchō shiryō chōsakai, Yūfūsha, Kaikin sareta Makkāsā ākaibuzu: saikō subeki Kumazawa tennō mondai (2014: no further publication 
information available).
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and smoked a corncob pipe, but in respect of his sway over 
the Imperial Household he was the virtual reincarnation 
of Ashikaga Takauji. MacArthur had to contend with an 
entirely diﬀerent set of circumstances, to be sure, than did 
his shogunal predecessors. But in many ways MacArthurʼs 
challenges had been Ashikagaʼs, too. Both men had to weigh 
a host of complications and possible repercussions, whether 
the decision was to keep the imperial status quo or overturn 
it. But there was a key diﬀerence. Popular sentiment, and the 
certainty of being blamed if another civil war broke out in 
the wake of a badly made decision on the emperorʼs status, 
weighed much more heavily in MacArthurʼs mind than it had 
in Takaujiʼs.
But in the twentieth century as in the fourteenth, the honor 
of monarchs must needs contend with the machinations of 
generals. Amid the fraught interplay of the Imperial Household, 
the American Occupation, the new constitution devised to 
keep Japan in perpetual vassalage to the Washington hegemon, 
and the security arrangement between the United States and 
Japan which made the latter a policy adjunct of the Pentagon, 
we must go deeper to get at the heart of the issue raised by 
Kumazawa. What had changed, and not changed, in respect 
of the right of conquest?12 The crux of the several narrative 
planes—Kumazawa, the Meiji Emperor, Emperor Go-Daigo, 
Emperor Go-Kameyama, and the Shōwa Emperor whose 
fate it was to run the most treacherous gauntlet in Japanese 
history—is the conquering force of warriors, and the ways in 
which the justiﬁcations for conquest have shifted over time.
The right of conquest is virtually unheard-of today—a 
relic buried in the distant past, perhaps, when kings and 
empires waged war for booty and plunder, but no longer 
applicable in the age of the United Nations, the Geneva 
Convention, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact. But in appealing 
to Gen. Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of 
the Allied Powers, an American warrior who ruled Japan by 
virtue of victory in violent conﬂict, Kumazawa Hiromichi 
was tacitly acknowledging that the right of conquest was still 
very much at work in the world. It is highly signiﬁcant that, 
while Kumazawa Hiroshika appealed to the Meiji Emperor, 
Kumazawa Hiromichi and other postwar pretenders to the 
throne appealed, not to the Shōwa Tennō, but to a man born in 
Arkansas, educated in Texas, and dispatched by a government 
wedged into reclaimed swampland between Maryland and 
Virginia. By dint of having won a war, the Americans had 
acceded to ruling legitimacy. And the American turn at 
straddling the globe like a colossus shows that the right of 
conquest had come to be couched in very diﬀerent language 
than before. When Mr. Izumo, the exasperated letter-writer 
whose remarks appeared in the Jiji Shimpo in 1947, pointed out 
that Kumazawa was being laughed at by “the people,” he was 
unwittingly rehearsing the very logic of popular endorsement 
(whether real or manufactured) that had underwritten the 
Americansʼ entire foray into the forging of empire: might 
makes right if there are elections which follow tidily in mightʼs 
train.
In order to understand Kumazawaʼs appeal to Gen. 
MacArthur and the American Occupation of Japan overall, 
then, we must understand the right of conquest. What is the 
right of conquest, and how, if at all, has it changed? The best 
summary source remains Sharon Kormanʼs 1996 monograph 
The Right of Conquest: The Acquisition of Territory by 
Force in International Law and Practice. The title is slightly 
misleading. Kormanʼs thesis is that the right of conquest as 
understood today is about both territorial acquisition (she 
gives a wide range of examples, such as the United Statesʼ 
acquisition of the Philippines, Israelʼs annexation of the Golan 
Heights, and Indonesiaʼs appropriation of East Timor), but 
also, and much more importantly, how territorial acquisition 
has given way to ideological justiﬁcations for warfare. It may 
be technically illegal for states to wage “aggressive war” now, 
but that has clearly not prevented them from doing just that. 
Therefore, the right of conquest now encompasses something 
very diﬀerent from “the acquisition of territory by force”. It 
has, in the twenty-ﬁrst century, much more of an ideological 
than a territorial valence, and has been moving increasingly in 
this direction for nearly two hundred and ﬁfty years.13
Whereas princes of the past could point to their own 
territorial ambitions as cause for invasions of othersʼ 
12 “Perhaps nothing is more indicative of the social and psychological revolution now in progress in Japan than the changed status of the Imperial 
Family. This change has been wrought in two years and is so drastic that if any one [sic] in Japan had even suggested it before the war, he 
would have paid for his rashness with his life. [︙] First to feel the eﬀects of the revolution was the Emperor himself. [︙] The new constitution 
removed the Emperors [sic] sovereign rights and conferred them on the people. The nation—its land and its people—which hither to [sic] 
had been the private property of the Emperor, was given to the people. The freedom to decide their own destiny, think as they pleased, and 
govern themselves was granted to all subjects, who became citizens. [︙] The Emperor lost all political power and remained a symbol of the 
nation and the peopleʼs unity. He retains his empty title of ʻEmperorʼ but has no empire over which to reign. The Japanese Empire has fallen 
and the so-called Emperor is reduced to a colorless, powerless, little King who reigns, but does not rule, over four small islands which are 
called Japan.” MacArthur Archives, Classified GHQ Intelligence Reports on the History of the Chrysanthemum Throne, “Part 3: Imperial 
Family Loses Status,” dated both 13 and 15 December, 1947, found in Declassified Documents from the MacArthur Archives, in Kaikin sareta 
Makkāsā ākaibuzu, op. cit.
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lands, governments today must claim some other reason—
“security,” “preemptive action,” “maintaining the rule of law,” 
“counterterrorism,” and “making the world safe for democracy” 
have all been cited by warring rulers of recent memory—for 
taking military action against rival states. Before crossing the 
tiny Rubicon River in 49 BC, provincial governor and Roman 
general Julius Caesar told his armies that it was his drive for 
power that compelled him to transgress the traditional frontier 
of Rome proper and do battle against his homeland. His 
legions, convinced, followed him across the sacred dividing 
line between home and abroad and into civil war. The will of 
princes remained the soul of the law until at least the time of 
Frederick the Great, whose transparently fatuous justiﬁcations 
for invading Silesia in 1740—justiﬁcations concocted at 
his direction by his hapless ministers of “justice”—belied 
whatever veneer of international law jurists might have been 
able to apply to European realpolitik.
Gradually, however, such kinetic machismo fell out of 
favor. Even some crowned heads of Europe were shocked by 
Frederick the Greatʼs naked ambition, and a consensus began 
to emerge among scholars of law that abrupt maneuvers by 
covetous monarchs—such as Frederickʼs, which touched oﬀ 
the Seven Years War, the ﬁrst truly world war in history—
had to be tucked under the cover of international law and 
somehow contained. As the “Enlightenment” ideas of John 
Locke, Immanuel Kant, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau gained 
traction in Europe, concepts, and not the will to power, became 
the preferred screen for acts of ambition. The trend toward 
ideological justiﬁcation for preemptive strikes has continued 
apace, such that, today, it is rare for any state to admit that 
territorial aggrandizement or unprovoked aggression is 
justiﬁed by the sovereignʼs will to power. When the CIA, FBI, 
and other agencies of the United States federal government 
orchestrated a coup against President Donald Trump, for 
example, they claimed to be acting to “preserve the sanctity 
of the democratic process”.14 Few men would dream of failing, 
as Caesar had, to try to sanction his play for power with an 
“Enlightenment” trope. Such appeals to ideologies—the 
universal solvent of responsibility in the modern world—are 
de rigueur in the twenty-ﬁrst century.
The key tension in the evolution of the right of conquest, 
as Korman makes clear, is between practical necessity and 
theoretical nicety. In theory, ex injuria jus non oritur: “rights 
cannot arise from a wrong or unjust act”.15 I cannot commit 
a crime and then claim that I have derived a beneﬁt from my 
actions. If I rob a bank, for instance, or trespass on someoneʼs 
private property, I cannot claim that the money or the property 
is rightfully mine, just because I was strong or clever enough 
to take it. Ostensibly, rights and jurisprudence are rooted in 
substantial due process and the rule of law.
In practice, however, states often do recognize the 
wanton acts committed by other states.16 In fact, the mutual 
recognition of acts of aggression was long a bedrock principle 
of international law. As Korman explains:
Prior to the twentieth century, positive international 
law did not distinguish between just and unjust causes 
of war, nor did it prohibit the use of force for territorial 
aggrandizement, so that the seizure of territory by an 
aggressor involved no injuria and the maxim [of ex 
injuria jus non oritur] did not apply. It was only after 
the First World War, when international law prohibited 
the acquisition of territory by conquest, that the conﬂict 
between conquest and the ex injuria jus non oritur 
principle became important; and even then the problem 
did not arise in respect of the validity of the fruits of past 
aggression, because of the applicability in such cases 
of the principle of intertemporal law—namely, that the 
legal validity and eﬀects of events have to be judged by 
reference to the law in force at the time they occurred.17
There is thus a basic contradiction at the heart of 
international law, a contradiction which undermines the 
discipline even as states appeal to it for justiﬁcation for their 
own actions. Weaker states claim that rights do not arise out 
of unjust actions. However, the fact is that rights can and do 
arise out of injustices, and have very often arisen out of even 
the grossest violations of territorial sovereignty and the worst 
infringements on basic human rights in the past.
At the same time, this contradiction, while seeming 
to invalidate international law tout court, simultaneously 
bolsters it, too, because the moral component of state-to-state 
interaction does not disappear, no matter how many times it is 
dispensed with.
Prior to the twentieth century, there were numerous 
13 See Noam Chomsky, with Edward Said, Acts of Aggression: Policing “Rogue” States (New York: Seven Stories Press, 1999) and Carl 
Schmitt, tr. George Schwab, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006).
14 See Jason Morgan, Let Us Now Praise Famous G-Men, Chronicles, July, 2019.
15 Korman, 12
16 This is essentially the argument deployed by Naramoto Tatsuya in dismissing Kumazawaʼs claims. See Naramoto Tatsuya, ed., Tadashii 
Nihonshi (Tokyo: Kawade Shinsho, 1955), 81-84.
17 Korman, 12
－33－
麗澤レヴュー　第 25 巻　2019 年 9 月
instances in which the threat or use of force to acquire 
territory was regarded as unjust, even though the threat 
or use of force to acquire territory was not illegal. This 
was a consequence of the fact that under the traditional 
international system, states considered themselves 
subject to moral restrictions on their right to resort to war, 
even if they were not also subject to legal restrictions 
in that respect. It was, therefore, precisely this lack of 
correspondence between the requirements of international 
morality, which disapproved of wars fought for an unjust 
cause and of conquest resulting from such wars, and the 
requirements of international law, which did not, which 
appeared on the political plane to prevent the operation 
of the principle that from a wrong or unjust act, no rights 
could arise.
Moreover, even from the standpoint of legal theory—
independently, that is to say, of any moral or political 
considerations—there was an undeniable incongruity 
inherent in an international legal system which 
recognized the unrestricted right of states to resort to war 
and conquest.18
It was therefore a perennial challenge to the seeming 
lawlessness of sovereigns that conquest required some kind of 
explanation beyond the mere fact of princely ambition.
Indeed, this challenge is also at the core of international 
law. As Yoram Dinstein explains:
the freedom to indulge in war without thereby violating 
international law seemed to create an egregious anomaly. 
It did not make much sense for the international legal 
system to be based on respect for the sovereignty of States, 
while each State had a sovereign right to destroy the 
sovereignty of others. On the one hand, it was incumbent 
on every State to defer to a plethora of rights accorded 
to other States under both customary and conventional 
international law. On the other hand, each State was at 
liberty to attack any other State whenever it pleased.
This state of aﬀairs yielded the paradoxical consequence 
that under traditional international law a new status 
quo could legally originate in the destruction of the 
legal rights of others. It is precisely this phenomenon, 
reﬂected in the regular sanctioning in international law 
of territorial change brought about by force, and of peace 
treaties imposed upon the defeated, which has led Robert 
W. Tucker to identify as a characteristic feature of the 
traditional international system ʻthe virtually unrestricted 
operation of the principle ex injuria jus oritur, and thus 
︙ the near equation of law with powerʼ—notwithstanding 
the fact that the use of force to acquire territory was not 
technically an injuria under that system.19
This “paradox” required a repair, and the binding 
eventually chosen to seal the breach between theory and 
practice was ideology. The watershed separating the older 
paradigm of right of conquest coexisting uneasily with moral 
sanction, to the new, and current, paradigm of right of conquest 
operating under cover of ideological justiﬁcation, was the 
French Revolution.
DemocraticIdeologyasSublimationoftheRight
ofConquest
Before the French Revolution, so-called “Enlightenment” 
thinkers such as John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau had 
begun to espouse a theory of government based upon the 
consent of the governed. Most famously, Rousseauʼs Social 
Contract implied that governments enjoyed the sanction of 
those under their control. If governments lost this sanction, 
then they lost legitimacy, and populations had the right to 
revolt and replace the government which had broken the social 
contract.20 “The doctrine of the self-determination of peoples,” 
18 Korman, 13
19 Korman, 14, citing Michael Akehurst, Lectures on Modern History (London: Macmillan, 1926), P.P. Shaﬁrov, A Discourse Concerning the 
Just Causes of the War between Sweden and Russia: 1700-1721 (1717) (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, 1973), Hedley Bull, The 
Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London: Macmillan, 1977), Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, 3rd Ed. (Cambridge: 
Grotius Publications, 1991), and Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence (Cambridge: Grotius Publications, 1988).
20 Korman asserts that the new “Enlightenment” view, and especially that of Emer de Vattel (1714-1767), “tempered” previous centuriesʼ 
conceptions of absolute monarchy. Korman ﬁnds that “the indiscriminate nature of the laws of war (and thereby of the right of the victor) 
was itself a function, partly, of the conception of war which prevailed at the time (as it had also prevailed in antiquity and the Middle Ages) 
before the modern state had fully developed, according to which war was a contention between the whole populations of belligerent states. 
This conception implied that ʻevery subject of one belligerent, whether an armed and ﬁghting individual or not, whether man or woman, adult 
or infant, could be killed or enslaved by the other belligerent at will.ʼ Korman, 30, citing Lassa Francis Lawrence Oppenheim, International 
Law, 1st ed. (London: Longmans, Green, 1905-06), 59. However, it is dubious whether this “all-population belligerency” really improved after 
Rousseau. Cf., e.g., Dresden, My Lai, the Moros, Nagasaki, and Wounded Knee.
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Korman states,
which became in 1789 the ideology of the French 
Revolution, had, by the time of Napoleonʼs defeat in 
1814, spread across Europe to an extent that made it 
impossible for the patrimonial principle [of imperium 
seen as coterminous with dominium] to be restored or 
incorporated as it had previously been into international 
law or morality. [︙] The logical corollary was that the 
right of conquest [︙] could itself no longer be part of 
international law. For if the principle of self-determination 
applies, then a victor cannot have a right to rule by virtue 
of conquest, but only by virtue of the peopleʼs consent.21
In other words, the physical fact of territorial conquest no 
longer suﬃced to justify aggression. Under the new Lockean/
Rousseauan scheme, the consent of “the people” had to be 
consulted before any military action could be considered to 
have eﬀected a permanent change in the geopolitical landscape.
The “self-determination of peoples” was just one thread 
in the ideological tapestry which was being woven de novo 
between 1789 and the Congress of Vienna (1814-1815). But 
this self-determination came with an important condition. Not 
all self-determination was to be treated equally. As Rousseau, 
the intellectual godfather of the Terror, had argued, “sometimes 
people must be forced to be free”.22 True to their roots, the 
French ideologues:
took an active interest in the right to intervention [in other 
countriesʼ internal aﬀairs], arguably to ensure freedom 
and human rights, in reality to extend French hegemony. 
[︙] War thus assumed the character of a crusade and made 
the unwritten laws governing the ʻcontrolledʼ conduct of 
war a thing of the past.23
The French Revolution thus conﬁrmed and ampliﬁed 
the “Enlightenment” trend of seeking cover for geopolitical 
realities in the plebiscite and not in the will of the monarch 
or emperor. In actual practice, however, plebiscites were new 
wineskins for the old wine of aggression. The only diﬀerence 
was semantic; the facts of conquest remained as before.
While as late as the latter days of the British Empire 
England largely hewed to the older doctrine of right of 
conquest,24 the United States eventually came to embody the 
spirit of the Congress of Vienna and of the French Revolution 
in its own expansion and conquest. From the beginning, the 
young American country justiﬁed its expansion—indeed, its 
very birth—in ideological terms. The American Founding 
Fathers, in high-ﬂown language cribbed largely from John 
Locke and rinsed liberally in the rhetoric of Rousseau, argued 
not that England had no title to the American colonies (title 
was a given—the Americans did not question that the English 
had appropriated title from the Native Americans by virtue 
of Lockean notions of development of natural materials and 
liberal notions of inherent cultural superiority), but that it had 
no right to govern them. And that right had been forfeited by 
failure to adhere to emerging Thermidorian ideologies avant 
la lettre. The most vociferous American colonists claimed that 
Englandʼs having abrogated a now-familiar list of ideological 
platitudes that the colonists accepted as axiomatic facts 
rendered null and void the English title to the New World. 
What the English had taken by force, in other words, the 
Americans now claimed in the name of ideas. While violence 
was also the method by which the colonies separated from the 
mother country, of course, the United States was seen, from 
the beginning, as an experiment, a swelling ideological tide, 
not won by the old ways of conquest but granted due to a 
surfeit of Rousseauan rectitude.
This ontological priority of ideology is on display from 
before 1776 until the present hour.25 Supreme Court Justice 
John Marshall, for example, famously referred to Indian 
tribes as “domestic dependent nations,” a decision in keeping 
with Robert Phillimoreʼs assessment that “it has become a 
cardinal maxim of [the United States Supreme Courtʼs] public 
jurisprudence that the system under which the United States 
were settled has been that of converting the discovery of the 
21 Korman, 37, italics in original. The French National Assembly proclaimed the French Revolution to be “a new international law. ︙ Hitherto 
only states had possessed legality; men followed the soil as it was conquered or ceded. On May 22, 1790, the Constituent Assembly formally 
renounced the right of conquest, declaring that manʼs will, freely expressed, was to determine the destiny of the soil.” Georges Lefebvre, trans. 
Elizabeth Moss Evanson, The French Revolution: From Its Origins to 1793 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), 196, cited in Korman, 
121.
22 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (1762), Book I, Ch. 7, “The Sovereign”.
23 Heinz Duchhardt, “From the Peace of Westphalia to the Congress of Vienna,” in Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters, eds., The Oxford Handbook 
of the History of International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 649.
24 See Rudolf Dolzer, “Falkland Islands (Malvinas),” Encyclopedia of Public International Law 12 (1990), cited in Korman, 105.
25 The contrast between the new American nation and the old British formulation of colonial rule is striking in hindsight. See, for example, 
Parliamentary debates over the Quebec Act of 1774, Korman, 33 ﬀ., citing, inter alia, William Harrison Woodward, A Short History of the 
Expansion of the British Empire, 1500-1930 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1931).
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26 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Robert Phillimore, Commentaries upon International Law, 2nd ed., (London: Benning, 
ca. 1855), 873, cited in Korman, 64.
country into conquest”.26 The idea, that is, was prior to the 
business of pacifying physical resistance by the benighted 
natives. Like the Grande Armée invading Spain, American 
colonists and militias pushed westward secure in the sense that 
forcing the aboriginal tribes to be free was the prerogative of 
a people which had discovered the gnostic formula of political 
fulﬁllment.
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